In this episode of 'The Axis'—your source for original insights on Iran and its Arab allies in the region—Ali Hashem and Mohammad Ali Shabani discuss two significant topics that are shaping the region as we know it. There is Operation ‘True Promise’: Iran's unprecedented drone and missile strike on Israel on April 14. What were its aims? Was it intended to kill? Who pushed for it? And most importantly, what can we expect next? Then there is the dealmaking that could reshape the region: Israeli-Saudi normalization, Iran-US 'de-escalation', and forging an economic dimension to the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement. In all three cases, the key to progress lies in an end to the Gaza war and US concessions.
In this episode of 'The Axis'—your source for original insights on Iran and its Arab allies in the region—Ali Hashem and Mohammad Ali Shabani discuss two significant topics that are shaping the region as we know it.
There is Operation ‘True Promise’: Iran's unprecedented drone and missile strike on Israel on April 14. What were its aims? Was it intended to kill? Who pushed for it? And most importantly, what can we expect next?
Then there is the dealmaking that could reshape the region: Israeli-Saudi normalization, Iran-US 'de-escalation', and forging an economic dimension to the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement. In all three cases, the key to progress lies in an end to the Gaza war and US concessions.
Mohammad: Welcome to ‘The Axis’, your source for original insights on Iran and its Arab allies in the region. My name is Mohammad Ali Shabani and I'm the editor of Amwaj.media.
Ali: And my name is Ali Hashem. I'm a journalist who has been covering the region for the past 20 years. Together we will dive into the politics and political economy of the regional alliance network known as the ‘Axis of Resistance.’
Mohammad: In today's episode, we'll be covering two significant topics that are shaping the region as we know it. So, let's dive right in. First is Operation ‘True Promise,’ Iran's unprecedented drone and missile strike on Israel on April 14. What were its aims? Was it intended to kill? Who pushed for it? And most importantly, what can we expect next?
Ali, I mean, I myself.. As much as I covered Iran and the ‘Axis [of Resistance],’ I did not see ‘True Promise’ coming. It was different. It was outside the framework for what I think most analysts expected. What do you think were its aims?
Ali: Well, Mohammad, the Iranians always surprise us. They’re always unpredictable. Whenever you predict that they are going to cool down, you see them on fire. Whenever you think that they are going to be on fire, they take the decision to take a couple of steps back. This time, maybe they were pushed to take this step. It was kind of a necessary step for them, or else this would have had great repercussions on the [Iranian] system itself, and it happened. The Israelis decided to target and kill General [Mohammad Reza] Zahedi at the Iranian consulate [in Damascus].
Of course, if this attack wasn’t to happen at the Iranian consulate, we wouldn't have seen all this happening. But the fact that it happened in the Iranian consulate changed all the calculations, not only for Iran, but for the whole region.
Mohammad: So, hold on, hold on, hold on. Sorry to jump in there. April 14 happened because of Israel’s suspected bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which killed General Zahedi, the top commander of the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’] Quds Force in the Levant. So, you're saying that if Israel's suspected operation had killed Zahedi outside the consulate, we would have had a different response?
Ali: Absolutely, absolutely. That was a game changer.
Mohammad: I get that, but then we have this kind of reporting that says that the Israelis didn't expect this kind of operation to be viewed as an escalation, that it was still part of the rules of engagement in Syria. You know, we've had hundreds of Israeli airstrikes since 2013, the Iranian military intervention.
Ali: Yeah, but not in an Iranian consulate. I mean, it's different.
Mohammad: No, I mean this is a really key point that I feel has really been missed. So, it's you would say that it's less about who was killed and it's more about where he was killed. And I mean, that makes sense to me, that makes sense to me because in Iran, you know, I think you'd be surprised, but I would say the average Iranian is highly aware of diplomatic conventions. Most Iranians will tell you that an embassy is the soil of that nation. And I think part of the reason for why there is this cognizance and awareness about diplomatic conventions is because the Islamic Republic was forged in a hostage crisis.. the US embassy crisis, right?
So, I think the average guy in the UK will have no clue about these kinds of things, but in Iran, it's very different. So, I absolutely agree with you that there was probably a lot of pressure to show some kind of reaction, you know, because the rules of the game have kind of there was an attempt to change them. So, I mean, if you say pressure from who?
Ali: I think the pressure was, the [Iranian] system was pressuring itself because over here it's an existential, I'm not saying a threat, but it's an existential decision. Either the state is going to defend itself, to defend its soil, given the fact that the consulate is an Iranian sovereign land, and it's [Iran’s] going to take this decision to retaliate, to respond, or else, this is going to become part of the rules of engagement. Here is the [core of the] issue. The Israelis thought that hitting in Damascus is part of the rules of engagement.
I don't think that this is actually part of the rules of engagement because this is what the Israelis have been imposing, have been imposing for the past years without an Iranian retaliation. But given the fact they [Israelis] crossed this line, Iran had to draw its own lines. And over here, I mean, this question of deterrence that we've been discussing and discussing and discussing for the past months and how the Iranians, given the fact that they've been always, you know, dealing in this way, you know, without retaliating for attacks, is giving the other side –mainly Israel and before of course the US after the killing of [former Quds Force commander] General [Qasem] Soleimani– giving them the feeling that there is no retaliation for any action and that's why they've been climbing the ladder.
Mohammad: Yeah, I mean, what you're talking about is escalation dominance. Yeah, it's escalation dominance. But let me push you a bit further on that point about the pressure.
Ali: Zahedi wasn't the first one [to be targeted], mMohammad , but he was the top one. And the Israelis weren't really stepping down, they were stepping up. And this is a real threat, not only for Iran, but also for Iran's allies in the region. So, who says that after the killing of Zahedi, there's not going to be an attempt, for example, on [the secretary-general of Lebanon’s Hezbollah Movement, Hassan] Nasrallah?
Mohammad: That's a key point and this is actually what I want to push you on next, which is you're saying that there was pressure from within the Iranian system to show some kind of response because this attack was seen as a game changer, as an attempt to change the rules of the game. And there's been a lot of talk about domestically what kind of pressures [Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei may have been under to respond. But what about pressure from other members of the ‘Axis [of Resistance’]? You're saying that they also may have sensed a threat.
There have been some reports about, for instance, [Yemen’s Ansarullah movement—better known as] the Houthis having shown a reaction and being among the ones pressing Iran to show some kind of response. What do you think about that? Do you think there's any credence to that kind of line of thought?
Ali: Well, personally, I don't think that the Iranian establishment is, let me say, a reactionist system. Decisions aren't really taken there. They are made. They are manufactured. And there are several layers that create a kind of a constant, create a decision to be taken by the higher leadership. And we saw on several occasions, whether it's the nuclear deal, or the deal with Saudi Arabia or many other, you know steps that Iran took. Some of these steps weren't really popular on the higher or the top echelon. For example, we know at least that with respect to the nuclear deal many were saying on several occasions that Ayatollah Khamenei wasn't really happy with the deal, but he had to accept the deal.
So, the fact is that in Iran these decisions are made, and are manufactured on different layers. And at the end, of course, Khamenei will have to know about every decision in the country, but it's not necessary that he should be happy with every decision in the country.
So, with respect to this moment, I think there was more of, you know, Israel was kind of betting more on Khamenei's, let me say, on him being a rational, on him being the rational wise thinker within the establishment on the top of the establishment in Iran…
Mohammad: That goes straight to the deterrence question. That's straight to deterrence, right?
Ali: And that you know that any step towards a retaliation would be seen by Khamenei as a step towards suicide, so he will stop that from happening, or he will order a small attack for example and that's it, it will contain the whole scene. But it seems that the decision-makers in Iran on different levels –whether it's the Supreme National Security Council, whether it's the IRGC, whether it's the House of the Leader, you know, all these main people in the decision-making process– they had a consensus, I mean, among themselves, that a response should represent Iran as a major power in the region.
So, that's why this response or this attack on the night of April 14 was multi-layered. There was a layer for the show. Everyone should see this attack. No one in the region should sleep without knowing that a vast, big, grandiose attack happened on Israel that night.
Number two, there was a target that they wanted to hit, and it was hit. Regardless of all the other rockets and drones that were intercepted, there was a main target to be hit and they were able to hit it. And the third and most important thing, Iran wanted to say that, okay, now this is a new era. We're turning the page, and we have our deterrence established now.
Mohammad: I mean, I think you bring up points that are valid, in my view. And all of what you're saying brings us to the main question, which is what to expect next. To me, the Operation ‘True Promise’ was about careful choreography, it was also about advanced planning, and in many ways it was a gamble in the sense that they [the Iranians] obviously knew that Israel is not going to act alone, and I think they [the Iranians] were probably betting that most of the drones and missiles would be shot down and prevent the massive bloodshed that could trigger war.
So, this is the kind of contention here because when you talk to technical experts alone, and I've spoken to missile experts, for instance, people who specialize in the Iranian missile program, and they say probably the operation may have been intended to kill. What we saw on April 14 was precisely what you would expect Iran to do in case it was attacked and firing drones, firing missiles etc.
However, to me, that kind of misses the point because it misses the political context. The political context is a careful choreographing, it is the advanced messaging. So, it's a gamble to make sure that others –and what I mean by others is mainly the United States– step in and try to contain the situation and I think that's what [US President Joe] Biden successfully did.
To me, one other side effect of that kind of containment of the Iranian attack was that it helped create a perception in the region that Israel relies on others in a war scenario. And to me, from the Iranian perspective, that's a major win when it comes to deterrence. So mindful of all of this and mindful that, for instance, one of the things that the IRGC has said after [Operation] ‘True Promise,’ has been that any Israeli attack on any Iranian individual or interest or assets in the region will be faced with a direct response. So, I mean, that's an attempt to change the game as well in response to what happened on April 1st with the bombing of the Iranian consulate, right?
Then the natural follow-up question is we saw what happened in Isfahan, we saw a very, very, very limited operation. You know, you and I, we reported based on our sourcing from Arab and Iranian sources that there was pressure on the Israelis to limit their response. Iran on its part downplayed what happened [indicating] they're not after war. Mindful of all of this, what can we expect next? Do you think this can be put in the freezer for now or are they going to remain on the edge for how long? What's the endgame here?
Ali: Well, before that, I mean, the question is, was this what Israel could do, or was this what Israel was asked to do, to limit its response to? Because answering this question based on, of course, information or based on at least some good sourcing would tell us what's the status quo on the region.
For example, I can just zoom in on the Lebanese front for example. For the past months, it's been like seven months now since the beginning of the war in Gaza and you know post the [surprise attack on Israel by Hamas on the] October 7, the Lebanese front kicked off. Since the first day there were clear threats from the Israelis that next month, maybe the month after, in the next weeks, in the coming weeks… there is going to be a [military] campaign, a vast major campaign on South Lebanon to try push Hezbollah to the Litani River which is like 30 kilometers from the border. And of course, in parallel there was, you know, there were those tours by the American envoy Hochstein, [US Special Presidential Coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Energy Security] Amos Hochstein.
Now the fact that those days at the beginning it seems that Hezbollah and Iran were overwhelmed with the threats or deterred by the threats that any mistake that's going to be outside the drawn rules of engagement could start a war. But later on, it was clear that the Israelis weren't really, I'm not saying they are not capable weapon-wise or firewise, but you know to launch a war you should be able to achieve your targets. You should be able to fulfill your objectives. It wasn't clear that the Israelis on this layer were capable of achieving their objectives. So, I mean, a war would be senseless. I mean, it would be without a result and maybe would have negative repercussions. So, it was clear that the threat of the war was the real weapon and not the war.
Now, in the case of the response towards Iran, the idea of containing the Israeli response was the main headline. But was the Israeli response contained or really Israel isn't really after a regional confrontation? So, it's threatening that it [Israel] could take the region into a confrontation with all the acts that it was doing in the past few months and of course with the lack of deterrence from the other side. But when the moment of truth came, it seemed that everyone went back to their, you know, normal positions.
Mohammad: So, the outcome of all of this ultimately is do we have new established rules in the game? And I would argue that no, we don't. This is going to be an ongoing process; it's going to be push and pull. And the question is, will it be contained? We had a third party step in at this point and how long will they be able to do that? How successful will they be? To me, this is an open question and even though this current instance of direct back and forth between Iran and Israel has ended for now –as you rightly point out– there is continued activity on the Lebanon-Israel front. And I don't, to me, I'm trying to look at the bigger picture here.
What stands out is that there are two possible outcomes apart from a ceasefire in Gaza that could really show a way out: One is the efforts of the US to forge a deal on the land border between Lebanon and Israel and that would be huge. They already negotiated on the maritime boundary and the US was quite successful in that, and most of all, what really stood out to me about that part was that the IRGC and its media affiliates more or less frame that as victory without war. And this tells me that IRGC is not after war, just as Hezbollah, neither of them want conflict.
The second thing to me is if there can be movement towards some kind of resolution to the Golan [Heights], that would be another huge thing, positive thing to come out of all of this. I think that would be quite valuable, maybe even to the extent of the next topic, which we're going to discuss, which is the normalization prospect between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Before we continue, let's take a moment to pause and reflect.
Ali: Stay tuned. We’ll be right back after this short break.
Ali: Now that we're back from the break, three deals that could shift the region. Israel-Saudi normalization, Iran-US reengagement, and Iran, [the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] KSA, and [the Gulf Cooperation Council] GCC economic engagement. What are the stumbling blocks?
Mohammad, so in case the war in Gaza comes to an end and everyone wants to, I mean, there is nothing that's going to be similar to what was before October 7. But of course, there are many files and many talks that are going to be brought back to the new era that's going to be the post-Gaza war era. So, what's your take on that?
Mohammad: You know, these past few weeks, Iran, Israel, their confrontation has sucked up all the oxygen in the room. Under the surface, the input I've been receiving and the input which I believe you have also been receiving is that there are efforts to forge breakthroughs.
The Israelis and the Saudis are set to be, and I know this has been said many times, and I know the disclaimers about the impact of the absence of a ceasefire in Gaza, about the upcoming US elections, I know all of that but despite all of that, informed sources say that the Israelis and the Saudis are close to normalization and that [the] October 7 [attack by Hamas] did not stop that, even though some argue that one of the aim of October 7 was to stop this process.
The second aspect that I've heard is that in the past six weeks or so, the US side has continued to send signals to Iran that it is willing to reengage. And what I mean by reengage is not to revive the nuclear deal. It's rather to talk about what's referred to as the “de-escalation understanding” reached last year.
The de-escalation is about exactly what the name suggests, which is to reduce tension. And it entails a number of steps, both regional and nuclear. On the nuclear front, for instance, it entails Iran agreeing to halt the acceleration of its 60% enrichment. And it also involves turning down tensions in places like Iraq and Syria, where US forces have been under fire since October 2023 from Iran's Iraqi allies. And there are a number of other steps.
On the US side, what they've offered in return is a form of, I wouldn't say sanctions relief, I would rather say implementation of the provisions within sanctions legislation to allow Iran to, for instance, access some of its frozen resources abroad. And I'll give you a specific example of this. There's a substantial amount of money held in Iraqi bank accounts that have accumulated as a result of Iranian energy exports to Iraq. As part of the de-escalation deal that they agreed to last year, some of this money was permitted to be moved to third party countries such as Turkmenistan, where Iran's gas debts to Turkmenistan were paid some of Iran's dues to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Saudi Arabia, etc.
So, all of that was on track to lead somewhere and then October 7 happened, which put a freeze on it. And I think now with the situation with Iran and Israel, I think the Biden administration is trying to push further to revive that process, mindful that it needs to be able to contain the Iran-Israel confrontation. It needs to lower tension in the region.
And the final point is beneath the surfaces of all of this, I see these two processes, the Israeli-Saudi normalization and the Iran-US engagement, as being twin processes and being tied to a third one, which is economic engagement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states –this is a core element for any process between Iran and Saudi Arabia to be sustainable.
Tehran and Riyadh, they agreed in March 2023 to normalize diplomatic relations under Chinese mediation. That's been progressing. Right now, we have Iranian pilgrims, for instance, in the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia]. We've seen [the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud] MbS speak to Iran's president [Ebrahim Raisi], hosting him, many engagements on a senior diplomatic level between the two countries, but the economic elements are completely missing and that's not going to materialize in the absence of some kind of arrangement with the US.
So, do you have these three parallel processes which harbor the potential to really reshape the region. And I think in all of these processes, all three of them, the common denominator is that each of them relies on US concessions of some sort. And at the heart of it is also, I mean, Gaza, obviously.
Ali: Yeah, I want to start from there. I think without the bottom line, which is reaching a ceasefire in Gaza, there is no chance to see real development on these fronts. But there's a very good precedent now with the US president's role in trying to contain the Israel-Iran tension. And I think that was one of the major Biden administration successes in the region in the last few months, especially with the failure on reaching a Gaza ceasefire over the past months also.
Now, still I'm quite a bit, you know, careful not to be too optimistic because at the same time, there are some limitations. Given the war in Gaza and all that has unfolded over the past weeks; the issue is that currently we are in a situation where Iran could be rethinking its deterrence strategy, its defensive strategy. And rethinking this defensive strategy would mean boosting its deterrence in different ways, including what could happen on the ballistic front, maybe boosting the distances of the rockets, and most importantly, what Iran could think with respect to its nuclear program and the nuclear option.
So, these are big questions. Maybe it's the best time for the Biden administration to invest in trying to get the region into what you mentioned of these three paths, of course. But this should be quick, it should be rapid, building on the current situation, the current status quo, because any delay in building on this status quo and building on what happened in the past few weeks could mean different settings and could mean much difficult Iranian conditions when it comes to convincing the Iranians to get into, you know… I mean… the situation is ripe for reengineering the regional security status or setup.
Mohammad: I understand your point. You're basically saying that they need to use the momentum of their successful ability to contain Israel and contain the Iranian attack, and it showed that the US is still an active force in the region that if it really wants to, it can intervene in a positive way. I get all that, and they should use this momentum. However, we have a number of stumbling blocks to that.
Number one is the US elections in November, and this is a two-way street. On the US side, this means that they're going to be quite constricted. Whatever Biden does, he's going to face opposition in Congress and on things like Iran, that's almost permanent. It doesn't matter what time of the year it is, right? That [opposition] is always going to happen.
The second thing is that on the other side of the equation, in places like, let's say, Iran or in places like Saudi Arabia, I think that they're going to be very cautious about what they may do before November for a variety of reasons. For the Iranians, it could very well be that they're not, they're almost unlikely, according to most experts you speak to, to conclude any major nuclear agreement with Biden before November, because they've had an experience in which they concluded a deal with a democratic president, and it was completely unraveled by [former US president Donald] Trump.
And they may face an identical situation later this year, right? So, they're not going to do that. It's very unlikely. That's why they're focusing on de-escalation instead. So, I think there is an element or there's a momentum here and it can turn into progress, but we have to be realistic about the amount of progress that can be made.
When it comes to the Saudis, I think it's identical. Are they really going to lock themselves into a deal like that? A mega deal with the Israelis, which chiefly consists of US concessions, right? So, what they wanted was massive security commitments from the Americans; people have talked about NATO-style commitments. And the second thing is some kind of nuclear technology, right? The question is, are they willing to, even if they do get all of the concessions that they want, are they willing to enter into that kind of arrangement before November mindful that that can be interpreted as backing a certain candidate in US domestic politics?
Maybe that's not the smartest move. And one more thing I would throw in here is that if Biden were to go ahead and press and really press to get this thing –what I mean by this thing is diplomacy in the region, including normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which he has put at the top of his regional agenda– if he gets it through, it's going to have side effects.
One of these side effects is that for instance, the Qataris are apparently not very happy about being singled out about being targeted for their mediation between Hamas and Israel. They are also very cognizant that the upcoming US elections may change the political map in Washington quite a bit. They had the experience of what happened during 2017 with the blockade under Trump, if you remember that, and they, I don't know how serious they are, but I think this is connected to what they're currently saying about potentially just pulling out of the mediation, just relocating the Hamas leadership, which in turn can very much impact the ceasefire in Gaza. Do you see the cycle here?
So, it's all connected together. So, the question to me is what is the formula? What is the specific formula to support these three processes? The Israel-KSA normalization, the Iran-US reengagement, the Iran-GCC economic collaboration because these three things I think, to really reshape the region, they need to happen in parallel. And if they don't happen and one of the keys is Gaza, I get that, but there's so much tied into that, right? How sustainable, for instance, can a ceasefire be in Gaza if mediation collapses? Even if it's reached throughout the channels.
Ali: Well, there's also another issue, which is the day after and how each side is imagining the day after. I think for the moment, there is no consensus over how things are going to be after the potential ceasefire, which doesn't seem to be, you know, on the horizon, at least for now. There are many complications that are hurdling such a deal.
And as far as this war is going to continue, the stumbling blocks are going to be there. And aside from these stumbling blocks, how each side, as I said, are kind of imagining the day after, which is really a difficult thing in such moving times, in such changing times. And that's why, of course, the three deals are essential for regional stability, but the problem is that the three deals are dependent on what's going to happen and how the war in Gaza is going to end.
Ali: That's all for today's episode of ‘The Axis’. We hope you found our discussions insightful and thought-provoking.
Mohammad: Don't forget to subscribe for future episodes and join us next time as we continue to explore the ever-evolving landscape of the region. Until then, stay informed, stay curious and stay engaged. I am Mohammad Ali Shabani.
Ali: And I’m Ali Hashem signing off.
Mohammad: The music you’ve been listening to is by France-based Tunisian artist Deena Abdelwahed. Thank you to her for allowing us to use her music.